Tag Archives: Afghans

Shock & Awe: Afghan literacy program fails

Hundreds of billions were spent on an Afghan Army, Air Force, and Police that will disintegrate without U.S. support.  Renewable energy was another money pit.  And still there were all those wasted driving lessons.  Yet someone thought that spending hundreds of millions on literacy would teach grown men to read in a country that doesn’t have a unified language or culture.

The Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction (SIGAR) reported the failure of the literacy program in their most recent report.  Since 2008, SIGAR has been swooping in like a vulture to investigate the use of “relief funding” in Afghanistan and recording their findings in reports that had less readership than the Dari version of Bill Press’s last book.

For anyone with half a brain, it is no surprise that After $200 Million, Afghan Soldiers Still Can’t Read.  Given that success in Afghanistan has been linked to literacy (see pp. 54-55 of DoD’s 2012 Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan) this does not bode well.

But there is hope.  On the eve of our surrender, SIGAR recommends:

  1. Establishing program goals that are reasonable given the time frames involved and ensure that progress toward achieving these goals is measurable.
  2. Revising the acquisition approach to include requirements for verification of students’ language capabilities and tracking of literacy levels.
  3. Limiting, to the extent practicable, the number of classes offered at training locations that cannot be inspected.
  4. Enhancing oversight of the new quality assurance contractor’s performance.
  5. Modifying the contracts to better define requirements for classes.
  6. Developing and implementing—by April 30, 2014—a formal transition and sustainment strategy for the literacy training program.

What couldn’t be done in several years will surely be completed now that SIGAR has identified the problem.  If only someone  would (or could) read the report.

Hat tip: Bob Roughsedge

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We have met the enemy and he is insensitive

The U.S. Army believes that the U.S. military’s insensitivity is a reason why terrorists are killing us in Afghanistan.  More specifically, the Breitbart story “New Army Handbook: ‘Ignorance’ and ‘Lack of Empathy’ cause of U.S. Deaths” says a draft army handbook attributes the rise in Green-on-Blue deaths to our ignorance and/or lack of empathy for Afghans.

Confused yet?

Hello?  We’re spending BILLIONS in Afghanistan and giving THOUSANDS of lives and our own military thinks we are insensitive? 

This clearly reflects the intrusion of politics into our modern military–a shame and disgrace but a harbinger of things to come for new recruits.  Fortunately, the Breitbart article implies that the handbook should never see the light of day. 

But with kooks in Congress like Senator “we’ve got to eliminate the rich” Frank Lautenberg saying things like “[Republicans in Congress] don’t deserve the freedoms that are in the Constitution,” our military will be even more politicized and the “blame us first” mentality is not the last we’ll see of politics in uniform.

On a positive note, more homosexuals in the military should improve our sensitivity.

Picture of Afghanistan post-2014 not pretty

In August 2012, Vanda Felbab-Brown of the liberal Brookings Institution gave testimony to the House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, documented in Afghan National Security Forces: Afghan Corruption and the Development of an Effective Fighting Force

Even though this may be the current regime’s think-tank, Felbab-Brown gives quite an indictment of the Obama policy and her expert opinion painted a bleak picture for the future.  Some excerpts follow:

Despite the substantial improvements of Afghan security forces, few Afghans believe that a better future is on the horizon after 2014.

[Afghans] are profoundly dissatisfied with Kabul’s inability and unwillingness to provide basic public services and with the widespread corruption of the power elites. Afghan citizens intensely resent the abuse of power, impunity, and lack of justice that have become entrenched over the past decade. During that period of the initial post-Taliban hope and promise, governance in Afghanistan became defined by weakly functioning state institutions unable and unwilling to uniformly enforce laws and policies. Official and unofficial powerbrokers have issued exceptions from law enforcement to their networks of clients, who have thus been able to reap high economic benefits, and can get away even with major crimes. Murder, extortion, and land theft have gone unpunished, often perpetrated by those in the government. At the same time, access to jobs, promotions, and economic rents has depended on being on good terms with the local strongman, instead of merit and hard work.

Yet as the decade comes to a close, the political patronage networks too have been shrinking and becoming more exclusionary. Local government officials have had only a limited capacity and motivation to redress the broader governance deficiencies. The level of inter-elite infighting, much of it along ethnic and regional lines, is at a peak. The result is pervasive hedging on the part of key powerbrokers, including their resurrection of semi-clandestine or officially-sanctioned militias. Hedging against a precariously uncertain future is equally pervasive on the part of ordinary Afghans. Especially in the Pashtun areas that constitute the Taliban heartland, they will often send one son to join the ANA, and another to join the Taliban, and possibly a third son to join the local strongman’s militia, to maximize the chances of being on the winning side, whoever will control the area where they live after 2014.

The ANA appears to be increasingly weakened by corruption. This development is not new, but it may be intensifying. In some of the best kandaks, excellent soldiers are not being promoted because they do not have influential friends. Conversely, many extra positions, at the level of colonel, for example, are being created so that commanders can give payoffs to their loyal supporters. Soldiers from marginalized groups, without powerful patrons, or simply those who cannot afford to pay a bribe, are being repeatedly posted to tough environments whereas their better-positioned compatriots get cushier postings. Clamping down on such corruption is as important as increasing the ANA numbers.

The ANP has of course been notorious both for such intense ethnic factionalization, as well as for corruption. It is important that the international community continue to demand credible progress against both vices and carefully assesses whether personnel shifts are indeed motivated by efforts to reduce corruption or mask further ethnic rifts and the firing of one’s ethnic rivals.

But the ANP critically continues to lack an anti-crime capacity, and the anti-crime training it receives is minimal. Instead, the ANP is being configured as a light counterinsurgency and SWAT-like counterterrorism force. Yet, crime — murders, robberies, and extortion — are the bane of many Afghans’ daily existence. The inability of the Afghan government to respond to such crimes allows the Taliban to impose its own brutal forms of order and justice and to develop a foothold in Afghan communities. Worse yet, the ANP remains notorious for being the perpetrator of many crimes. 

The political and governance system in Afghanistan is, in fact, so pervasively corrupt and so deeply and intricately linked to key structures of power and networks of influence, that some prioritization of anti-corruption focus is required.

This all appears to be very much in line with the military thinking and there are no real surprises.  That it is public

Corruption, corruption, corruption. . .  In 2014 after 6 years of President Obama fighting the “right war,” it will still be George W. Bush’s fault.

Afghan Right Data Storage

Maybe this is Ali Mohd Kamil’s* idea of a filing system.  Since sinks are the prefered bathing venue (on the rare occasion when a bath is desired), the shower is a huge waste of space. . . until now.

Plenty of surplus space. . .

According to a U.S. official that may or may not desire to remain anonymous, this is “[Afghan] Government records storage at the Ministry of Interior.”  Continuing, he says:

Yes, these are showers;
No, the water has not been turned off; and
Yes, water drips from the shower heads.

Perhaps the record of U.S. involvement can be washed from the Afghan records if not the collective memory of the residents and our economy. 

. . . but it may be tough to find that “one” document.

The U.S. has thought of other document storage options.  But for $12 Billion, you would think someone would have thought of buying a file cabinet.

*Ali Mohd Kamil is an apparent Afghan entrepreneur that has posted a couple of shameless requests for work on other pages of this site.

Questioning the reliability of Afghans

President Obama issued an apology and is amazed that the violence in Afghanistan against U.S. and the coalition didn’t suddenly stop (By the way, why are we apologizing for destroying something the enemy is using to pass inflammatory, if not coordinating, information against us?). 

The GIRoA Ministry of Interior is conducting an investigation into the most recent killings perpetrated by ANSF personnel against coalition forces.  No doubt that’ll shed light on the situation.

ISAF leadership repeatedly asserts that infiltration and/or impersonations of Afghan Security Forces is not a problem even while “Green on Blue” violence increases. 

Now Fox News has stumbled onto something “new:” New violence stokes questions about reliability of Afghan partners in war.  For NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A), it is no big stretch to say that ANSF forces are the number one cause of death yet only now we are beginning to wonder if the Afghans are reliable.

Last year, an Afghan airman opened up an killed nine–and the Afghan Air Force is supposed to be among the most affluent groups in the ANSF.  Recently, the French suffered several dead due to the Afghans security forces. Short of an exhaustive search, it is safe to say these are fairly regular events.  Unfortunately, they have been treated as isolated and unrelated events and regarded as irregular which, coincidently, helps to preserve the illusion of progress.

Can there be any conclusion other than to question the reliability of the forces we’ve poured billions into over the last decade?  Maybe the solution is just to spill more blood and treasure.

Rainmakers in Foggy Bottom

Think trying to rebuild a war-torn, 14th century country, isolated from any reliable supply line, and surrounded by hostile countries is difficult?  Try finding a spot for a filing cabinet in the Afghan Embassy in Washington, DC. 

In the report After Scuffle at Afghan Embassy, a Spotlight on Connections, The New York Times stumbles across a few of the countless reasons Afghanistan is more than a country that simply needs a little help.  If this is how they treat themselves, imagine how they treat Americans, Brits, Canadians, Germans, Latvians, Mongolians, French, Spanish, Italians, Jordanians, Polish, Turks, etc., etc.  But you don’t have to imagine.  If you watch the news, they don’t just punch, they often kill.  And it’s getting better all the time.

There is a simple solution:  The Afghan installing the file cabinet needs to give the file cabinet to the objecting Afghan with a payment for the honor of trying to help (all paid with U.S. cash, of course).

Lactation and world peace linked?

This crazy headline from www.foreignpolicy.com caught my eye:  Clinton:  State drawing down in Afghanistan, building more lactation rooms in Washington.  The caption says it all regarding the State Department priorities. 

The headline wasn’t given a second thought at the time except to thing “more excess government spending.”   However, a very interesting thing caught my eye a couple of weeks later.  Perhaps these lactation rooms have some mystical power that we should have harnessed long ago–the Special Operators are apparently interested in them and planning for them at their facilities too:

Notice the label in the upper right of the site plan

Maybe the reason the Taliban is still mad at us is that we are only building for temporary lactation.  A little obtuse fun at the expense of our Afghan translators–the intended word is “location.”

But seriously–forget lasers, smart bombs, special tactics, and non-lethal weapons–maybe the Secretary of State is really on to something.  Lactation (and literacy centers) may bring the enemy to their knees.