Armed Forces Journal publishes another reality-check for the war (or whatever we are doing) in Afghanistan. LTC Daniel L. Davis writes the latest feature, “Truth, lies and Afghanistan: How military leaders have let us down.”
There are plenty of good news stories in Afghanistan but even the PAO’s best efforts can’t keep up with the bad-news stories. LTC Davis sobers up the most optimistic American by reviewing conditions on the ground 10 years after our war in Afghanistan started. First hand accounts demonstrate that the Afghans are far from taking over security in any meaningful way but one wouldn’t know any better from the open-source reporting.
Anthony Cordesman from the Center for Strategic and International Studies is quoted by Davis with the following:
Since June 2010, the unclassified reporting the U.S. does provide has steadily shrunk in content, effectively ‘spinning’ the road to victory by eliminating content that illustrates the full-scale of the challenges ahead. They also, however, were driven by political decisions to ignore or understate Taliban and insurgent gains from 2002 to 2009, to ignore the problems caused by weak and corrupt Afghan governance, to understate the risks posed by sanctuaries in Pakistan, and to ‘spin’ the value of tactical ISAF victories while ignoring the steady growth of Taliban influence and control.
Politics theoretically stop at the water’s edge. Clearly politics is driving how and why we continue in Afghanistan. Certainly there are other factors at play such as our ability to keep Special Operations Forces in Afghanistan long after we “leave.” But, as asked by Davis, at what price? Is the full price even recognized? Put yourself in the shoes of this officer’s shoes: “How do I look [my soldier’s] wife in the eye when I get back and tell her that her husband died for something meaningful? How do I do that?”
The Afghans recognize the price that will be paid and are taking action. From one advisor, “Already all across this region [many elements of] the security forces have made deals with the Taliban. [The ANSF] won’t shoot at the Taliban, and the Taliban won’t shoot them.” For those that can’t flee the country, survival takes on many different forms. Is anyone surprised by the self-preservation?
Davis completes his essay with the following:
When it comes to deciding what matters are worth plunging our nation into war and which are not, our senior leaders owe it to the nation and to the uniformed members to be candid — graphically, if necessary — in telling them what’s at stake and how expensive potential success is likely to be. U.S. citizens and their elected representatives can decide if the risk to blood and treasure is worth it.
Likewise when having to decide whether to continue a war, alter its aims or to close off a campaign that cannot be won at an acceptable price, our senior leaders have an obligation to tell Congress and American people the unvarnished truth and let the people decide what course of action to choose. That is the very essence of civilian control of the military. The American people deserve better than what they’ve gotten from their senior uniformed leaders over the last number of years. Simply telling the truth would be a good start.
Generals will be quick to point out, “Hope is not a plan.” If so, why is it the only logical thing that explains the current conditions?